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Cocooned: path dependence and the demise of Anderson & Robertson 
Ltd.: Scotland’s last silk throwsters 
 
 
‘Keep right on till the end of the road’ (Old Scots song made famous worldwide by Sir Harry Lauder) 
 
Abstract 
This study applies the insights of path dependence theory to a Scottish yarn producing firm 
which existed from 1877-1964. Previous longitudinal studies of firms and their strategies 
have concentrated on larger entities, but the present one tests the relevance of path 
dependence to smaller firms. The paper explains why the firm studied may be seen as an 
example of path dependence and lock-in, going on to point out why the generally accepted 
three-stage pathway of reducing organisational choice leading to lock-in appears to fit the 
case, but that more empirical research in the field would be beneficial. The paper highlights 
in detail the factors which reinforce path dependence and in particular, the role of 
organisational culture, which has not, hithertofore, been demonstrated with any precision. 
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Introduction  
This paper extends the body of research which has built up in the area of path dependence by 
providing a detailed, longitudinal account of a firm which employed between 200 and 700 
people, over a period of 87 years. The few detailed case studies of path dependence in 
organisations which exist have tended to concentrate on very large businesses, whereas the 
one which follows provides an opportunity to reflect on its relevance to smaller enterprises, 
which are much more numerous in economies than larger firms.  
 
The company concerned was a Scottish-based manufacturing business which operated in 
several locations near Glasgow between the years 1877 and 1964, firstly manufacturing silk 
yarn and ancillary products and latterly a range of silk and other yarns, for customers in the 
UK, Europe and beyond. Anderson & Robertson Ltd (A&R), as the firm came to be known, 
was the last producer of silk yarn in Scotland, a position it occupied from quite early in its 
history until its closure in 1964, supplying the remains of a largely forgotten, somewhat 
exotic branch of the local textile industry, the manufacture of silk fabrics. 1  
 
The firm operated throughout its life with a business strategy that served it well for the first 
two-thirds of its existence, and increasingly less well for the remainder, finally leading to its 
exit from business. Given that faltering strategies are not normally persisted with, this led the 
authors to explore whether or not the firm’s strategy was an example of path dependence and 
related ‘lock-in’, currently a topic of considerable interest in the management and historical 
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literatures. We concluded that it may indeed be seen as example of this phenomenon, for 
reasons which will be given below. 
 
Our study continues with a review of some key writings on path dependence, going on to 
provide an overview of the firm’s progress from its formation in 1877 up until the time of its 
voluntary liquidation in 1964. This is followed by a more detailed account of the firm’s final 
years, which will focus on its strategic thinking and its attempts to escape from the narrow 
business and related technological pathway to which it had become absolutely committed in 
the 1930s, particularly during the critical last decade of its operations as challenges in the 
business environment multiplied. An explanation as to why the firm may be considered an 
example of path dependence and associated lock-in then follows, including a discussion on 
the implications of the study for path dependence theory, especially in relation to smaller 
firms. The paper concludes with a summary of findings and closing reflections, particularly 
related to the deeper contextual and cultural conditions within firms which foster and 
reinforce path dependence. 
 
The principal source of information on the firm is its business records, which are kept at 
Glasgow University Business Archives. 2 These include an almost complete series of annual 
accounts, board minutes and shareholder records together with miscellaneous sales and 
production records, correspondence, advertising materials, scrap books and reports of various 
kinds. The archive also contains several short articles on the company’s history, including a 
brief but informative published article and some manuscript notes by the directors on the 
firm’s beginnings. Together, this material represents a resource of unusual richness and thus 
an opportunity to look closely at the firm’s decline and the internal reasoning which 
accompanied it, with minimal reliance on speculation or inference. 
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Path Dependence 
The topic of path dependence has for the last thirty years or so stirred up a great deal of 
academic interest. As defined by two authorities on the subject, ‘Most generally, path 
dependence means that where we go next depends not only on where we are now, but also 
upon where we have been. History matters’. 3 In other words, technologies, economies and 
firms have got to where they are today through a historical process which is likely to affect 
where they will go in the future. The focus of the path dependence literature has changed 
over the last few decades. Earlier papers such as Arthur 4 or Liebowitz and Margolis 5 
explored its relevance as an alternative analytical perspective for economics, considering 
inter alia the effects of suboptimal technological developments such as the Qwerty keyboard 
or the VHS recorder on economic growth. The success of these developments, which grew to 
dominate their respective industries, was based on two historical circumstances, their 
earliness in the market place and ready adaptation to them by the market, rather than 
technological superiority over alternatives. They were thus path dependent. Firms which 
pursued and invested in superior, rival, technologies were far less successful.  
 
As Liebowitz and Margolis 6 observe, ‘if outcomes [such as these] depend critically upon 
insignificant and unpredictable events, rather than on underlying conditions such as 
endowments and technology, then a historical chronicle is elevated in importance relative to 
other methods of explanation’. Authors such as Foray 7 have with this in mind introduced the 
notion of ‘regret’ in economic history, discussing alternatives to the many suboptimal 
technologies that have gone on to dominate in the market place as a result of path 
dependence. These he holds to include the internal combustion engine for the motor car, the 
alternating current as the standard electrical supply system in the USA, nuclear power and 
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sand moulding ferrous casting. Foray’s paper examined the conditions which caused these 
allegedly inferior technologies to come into being. Thus, ‘history matters’, in a double sense. 
Not only is it true that a peculiar set of events in the past, rather than economic or 
technological logic, can determine events and outcomes. It is also true that the archivally-
based, longitudinal focus of historical methodology is especially suited to highlighting these 
developments within the lives of firms. 
 
Scott’s 8 paper examined path dependence in relation to national infrastructure, considering 
the persistence of small coal wagons on Britain’s railway network before World War 2. He 
concluded that, while the small size and carrying capacity of the UK’s coal wagons made the 
system inefficient in terms of transport costs, there had been insurmountable problems in 
coordinating investment to improve wagon capacity across the many private owners, 
particularly of coal mines. This was based on the belief by the wagon owners that the savings 
from investment would not be passed on by the railway companies, on whose lines their 
wagons ran. Furthermore, the railway companies themselves were required by law to 
compensate owners for upgrading to larger wagons and would also have needed to alter their 
own facilities if a move to larger wagons had been possible. The problem could not therefore 
be solved, as the existing arrangements had grown out of a peculiar set of circumstances, had 
thus been path dependent and were now ‘locked in’. Again, the reasons for this were 
discovered through historical analysis, which emphasized the importance of context in 
understanding path dependence. 
 
More recent studies of path dependence have focused on organisational strategy. In this 
connection, Beyer 9 states that ‘path dependence... stresses the historicity of institutions, 
assuming that decisions taken in the past, established ways of thinking and routines have a 
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decisive impact on the present. Path dependence confines potential action alternatives and 
thus crucially impacts the course of future developments’. Koch 10 adds that path dependence 
is ‘ruled by one or more self-reinforcing mechanisms which lead to a narrowing of the 
variation and range of (managerial) discretion’. This affects the formulation of strategy and 
its implementation, which may come to restrict an organisation’s asset base and flexibility.  
 
An earlier study by David pointed out that path dependence relates to the existence of 
systems of ‘consistent mutual expectations’ of how things are normally done within 
organizations. 11 These systems are a part of an organization’s [cultural] ‘capital…[which]… 
will be modified only slowly over time’. 12 They can become ‘enduring constraints’ that are 
‘self-reinforcing’ in such a way that the organizational structure ‘can become “locked in” to a 
comparatively narrow subset of routines, goals and future growth trajectories’ 13 All of these 
factors, David pointed out ‘combine to favour “stasis”, or, at most, a course of change that for 
the most part is “incremental” and almost imperceptible’. 14  
 
However, it is widely recognized that path dependence may not necessarily have negative 
effects, and may or may not turn out to be dysfunctional. It is very important for businesses to 
recognise that it exists, even although it may be difficult for management to look objectively 
at the situation they have come to be in. 
 
In their important paper of 2009, Sydow, Schreyogg and Koch 15 attempt to extend the 
theoretical dimension of studies in path dependence relative to firm strategy, by producing a 
schematic which examines its emergence in three phases. Phase I is an ‘open situation’ of 
wide choice available to the management of firms. Phase II is introduced at a ‘critical 
juncture’ and brings about reduced choice together with the gradual emergence of an 
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organisational path. Phase III is where ‘lock-in’ to this path occurs and this can result in the 
organisation becoming so inflexible it cannot respond to changes or shocks in the 
environment and may be destroyed. In Phase III, the scope for choice has been narrowed by 
replicating the pattern of action, entered into at earlier stages, even more. The authors of this 
model do, however, state that ‘its functioning is likely to differ from context to context 
according to the prevailing conditions’, so they do not expect that it will apply precisely in all 
situations. 16 Whether that is the case or not, they note that the resultant lock-in ‘may be of a 
predominantly cognitive, normative, or resource-based’ kind, 17 or even a combination of all 
three, in the sense that beliefs and ways of looking at things may become entrenched and lead 
to a narrowing of the firm’s asset base. Extreme lock-ins can rule out alternative courses of 
action, but in organisational settings, because of their social nature, while ‘self reinforcing 
dynamics are expected to bring about a preferred action pattern, which then gets deeply 
embedded…orders can potentially stop inefficient replication’. 18 In other words, path 
dependence can be reduced or halted. However, as research has shown, it can also be very 
difficult to change organisational patterns and thus prevent organisational harm or disaster. 
 
Sydow, Schreyogg and Koch 19 next consider the self-reinforcing mechanisms which can 
perpetuate path dependency through positive feedback. They discuss four: 1) Coordination 
effects, which can bring about reduced coordination costs because a firm has chosen a less 
complicated trajectory than it might have done, 2) Complementary effects, where for example 
selling costs of products are reduced, if the range of products has been deliberately restricted, 
3) Learning Effects, where the longer an operation is performed, the more efficiently it is 
done, and 4) Adaptive Expectation Effects, which states that conformity in choices often 
comes from the social need for belonging among managers and the rewards that come with it. 
Sydow, Schreyogg and Koch add that contextual conditions in path dependent organisations 
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need further exploration. This is in line with David’s analysis, shown above, which refers to 
the influence of an organisation’s cultural ‘capital’, in the sense of its ‘ways of doing things’ 
and their effects on strategic decision making. Sydow, Schreyogg and Koch conclude their 
paper with a consideration of what tools can be used to break organisational paths if they are 
proving to be harmful. 
 
Some recent literature on the subject shows that there is still much controversy about path 
dependence. Noting that 214 papers about path dependence had appeared in seven major 
management journals between 2003 and 2007, Vergne and Durand observe with a sense of 
alarm that it remains ‘a blurry and controversial construct’. 20 They are concerned that ‘it is 
hard to tell what constitutes acceptable empirical evidence for path dependence’ and that 
some scholars ‘remain sceptical about the empirical support for path dependence’. 21 Their 
solution is to move away from case studies, towards simulations, experiments and 
counterfactual modelling in order to achieve more logical rigour in researching the role of 
contingency and self-reinforcement, two key factors they see as necessary for the creation of 
path dependence. 
 
In a 2015 paper by Schreyogg, Sydow and Holtmann, 22 these authors developed the 
framework of Sydow, Schreyogg and Koch outlined earlier, in an empirical case study, that 
of Bertelsmann AG, clearly, by implication, taking issue with Vergne and Durand and their 
aversion to case study methodology. Bertelsmann, over many decades, persisted with a 
strategy which depended on the maintenance of a book club, from the 1950s until the recent 
past, notwithstanding the fact that it had been in decline over much of the period. They 
subjected their analysis of the firm to the three phase schema developed by Sydow et al, 23 as 
outlined above, finding that Bertelsmann conformed to a pattern of reducing options which 
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led to path dependence. This was locked in by self-reinforcing processes, which included the 
appeal of ‘the glorious past’, together with the sharing of fixed costs and investment with the 
firm’s other publication activities. Various attempts to take the firm in other strategic 
directions, including exit from book club operations, were unsuccessful because ‘the old 
pattern proved so dominant’. 24 The authors of this paper expressed the view that their case 
study had gone ‘well beyond most former efforts’, many of which have referred to path 
dependence in a crude and imprecise fashion. They call for more precision in future studies of 
path dependence, both in examining the phenomenon itself and in studying the self-
reinforcing feedback processes which bring it into being and perpetuate it.  
 
The study which follows responds to their call, as well as to Sydow, Schreyogg and Koch’s 
2009 25 exhortation to explore the deeper contextual conditions within firms which foster and 
reinforce path dependence. 
 
A&R from 1877 to 1964-an overview 
The silk throwing business in the West of Scotland began in 1820 in Govan, Glasgow, when 
Morris Pollok erected the first mill in Scotland to undertake this type of work. At that point, 
demand for silk, to manufacture Paisley shawls and other silk products, caused about fifty 
‘throwsters’ to follow Morris Pollok’s lead and set up businesses in or near Glasgow. The 
process of ‘throwing’ involved the cleaning, turning, twisting, dyeing and reeling of imported 
hanks of raw silk, mainly from China, on special machines. The reeled silk was then sold to 
manufacturers of silk fabric. In 1876, George Robertson, who had been a cashier with Morris 
Pollok, took the opportunity to set up an independent silk throwing factory at John Street, 
Govan. A year later, William Anderson joined in partnership with Robertson, forming a silk-
throwing business known as Anderson & Robertson. The two new partners next rented the 
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mill formerly owned by Morris Pollok, which had in the interim failed. On Pollok’s death, his 
son diversified into silk textile production, but this was not successful, as the firm’s textile 
operations were then in competition with those to whom they sold the silk yarn and so the 
business collapsed. With their main business in silk yarn production, A&R came to employ 
up to 700 people during that period in their two Govan premises. The new business was 
successful and it continuously expanded, becoming a limited company in 1895. 26 At several 
points in time before and after 1895, although its main business was silk yarn production, the 
firm carried out some weaving of fabrics in its four plants in addition to its staple business of 
yarn throwing. 
 
In 1890, the firm had opened premises in Motherwell in Lanarkshire, some 15 miles away, to 
take advantage of the availability of female labour in a town which was fast becoming the 
centre of Scotland’s steel industry, also purchasing a small silk mill at Glemsford, in Suffolk, 
to build up silk throwing capacity. A consolidation of the Govan premises took place in 1902. 
The Scottish silk industry was falling away at this period, so the firm found customers outside 
Scotland, particularly in the neighbourhood of Macclesfield, near Manchester, which had a 
strong silk trade. In 1912, the firm started to produce silk yarn for the insulation of electrical 
wires, a business which continued for the rest of its life. From about 1924, the production of 
silk stockings from unboiled yarn vastly increased demand nationally and internationally, and 
the firm’s production of silk yarn rose again. In 1935, the firm centralized its production in 
Motherwell, having closed the Govan plant and the Glemsford factory at the same time. It 
produced silk yarn for wire insulation and parachute making during World War 2. From 
about 1951, nylon replaced silk for the manufacture of stockings, and this required new 
twisting machinery, together with investment in air conditioning and temperature control, 
which was essential for the production of nylon and the other synthetic yarns the firm started 
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to produce. From this point onwards, silk only accounted for some ten per cent of the firm’s 
business until its closure in 1964, which was ushered in as trading conditions deteriorated 
rapidly. The undernoted table summarises the firm’s profitability over its life as a Limited 
Company: 
 
Table 1: Anderson & Robertson Ltd., Profits after Tax and Returns on Capital 
Employed, 1896-1963 
Year  PAT 
£000 
RCE % Year  PAT 
£000 
RCE % Year  PAT 
£000 
RCE % 
1896 2.9 10.7 1919 2.9 8.4 1942 33.7 13.3 
1897 (0.8) (3.1) 1920 3.0 8.7 1943 29.0 10.5 
1898 2.7 9.3 1921 3.3 9.3 1944 7.1 2.9 
1899 2.1 6.9 1922 6.3 21.4 1945 8.8 3.6 
1900 1.3 4.4 1923 11.0 23.9 1946 18.0 7.2 
1901 0.8 2.6 1924 5.6 11.3 1947 15.5 6.7 
1902 1.3 4.5 1925 5.3 9.7 1948 15.3 6.5 
1903 1.9 6.5 1926 5.6 10.0 1949 13.5 5.3 
1904 0.2 0.7 1927 5.7 9.4 1950 20.1 8.3 
1905 0.8 3.6 1928 7.7 12.5 1951 12.9 5.3 
1906 n/a n/a 1929 12.9 19.1 1952 (4.9) (2.3) 
1907 n/a n/a 1930 12.7 17.2 1953 6.9 3.4 
1908 1.3 5.6 1931 13.0 16.1 1954 3.4 1.6 
1909 n/a n/a 1932 16.0 18.0 1955 11.2 5.2 
1910 n/a n/a 1933 24.3 23.1 1956 17.3 7.3 
1911 n/a n/a 1934 20.9 18.7 1957 (12.3) (5.8) 
1912 2.5 10.0 1935 33.4 25.3 1958 11.1 5.1 
1913 3.0 12.0 1936 34.7 22.9 1959 6.1 2.9 
1914 3.0 13.7 1937 51.4 28.2 1960 9.2 4.3 
1915 1.0 3.9 1938 n/a n/a 1961 (0.9) (0.5) 
1916 3.6 11.9 1939 33.0 16.5 1962 (1.9) (1.0) 
1917 4.1 12.6 1940 35.1 16.3 1963 (22.3) (11.1) 
1918 2.9 8.7 1941 37.5 16.0 1964 NA NA 
(Source: UGD 029/5/1/1, UGD 029/5/3) 
Note: Capital Employed is defined for this purpose as issued capital and reserves plus profit and loss account 
balance.  
 
The firm’s profits to about 1912 were consistent, if modest, as it came to terms with a 
reducing Scottish market and opportunities elsewhere. The years 1912 until the close of 
World War One show improving profits, helped by its new line of business, the production of 
silk windings for the insulation of electrical wire. Across the 1920’s and 1930’s, profits 
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reached very satisfactory levels, which related to the build up of production of silk yarn for 
the manufacture of ladies stockings, peaking at £51,400 after tax, or 28.2% return on capital 
employed, in 1937. After World War Two, conditions became more difficult as austerity took 
effect. From the 1950s onwards, the change from silk to synthetic yarns for the manufacture 
of stockings and other products affected margins, as did the growth in the use of these yarns 
generally. This was based on increasing investment within the textile industry in research and 
development in new yarns and fabrics as well as in machinery for their mass production.  
 
A&R did not have the vast resources required to create new synthetic yarns, which were 
developed by the very large petrochemical and textile combines, but it purchased new 
machinery for their twisting and processing. The value of machinery on the firm’s books 
stood at £35,000 in 1950, £65,000 in 1957 and £75,000 in 1960, as it improved its capacity 
for synthetic yarn production in response to the market. In 1952, 1957 and the firm’s closing 
years of 1961 to 1964, it made losses in spite of these investments. After exploring a number 
of alternatives and seeing no way out of the situation, it went into voluntary liquidation in 
1964. The section which follows examines the firm’s final years in some detail. 
 
The critical years, 1952-1964 
This part of the paper focuses on the firm's final period, as the business environment became 
much more difficult, in order to examine how A&R thought about the emerging crisis which 
it faced. We present this material in very fine detail, not only because it is unusual to gain 
insights into the precise reasoning of company directors in crisis, but also because, as will be 
shown later, the company’s heart was not in the alternative courses of action it discussed. The 
bulk of the information which now follows comes from a report produced by two of the three 
working directors, JC Scott, the managing director and WFT Anderson, the chairman, with 
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the help of their business advisors, AIC Consultants, by order of a board meeting held on 4 
March, 1963, as the firm found itself in the midst of increasing losses. 27  
 
Around 1950, there had only been about 20 throwsters in Britain and competition was 
limited. While A&R were the only throwsters in Scotland at this time, 95% of their business 
was done in England. A&R had been founder members of the British Silk Throwsters 
Association, formed in 1933, which enabled member firms to make price agreements among 
themselves. Prices were good in 1950 and compared favourably with those in Europe, 
enabling A&R to build up business there. The rise in the market for yarn for nylon stockings 
and the advent of Terylene had called for new investment, and A&R’s asset values were to 
more than double by the late 1950’s. By the middle 1950’s, signs of the acceleration of 
competition began to emerge. Between 1955 and 1960, the undernoted firms entered into the 
production and processing of man-made yarns: ICI Ltd., Crossleys Ltd., Courtaulds Ltd., 
Gallic Crepes Ltd., Qualitex Silks Ltd., John Shaw & Sons Ltd., Burnleys (Universal) Ltd., 
Carrington and Dewhurst Ltd., English Sewing Cotton Co. Ltd., Lancashire Cotton 
Corporation Ltd. (two Branches). 28 A&R were now in competition, not only with more 
firms, but with the giants of the industry, which had the backing of vast technological and 
financial resources. 
 
In 1956, over half of the firm's sales had been lost as customers began to use untwisted yarn 
for hosiery and weaving, following technological improvements in the industry. A&R 
immediately offset these losses by providing Terylene yarn for the Scottish curtain net 
industry situated at Darvel in Ayrshire. By 1960, this work rose to peak production. That 
same year, the firm acquired machinery to produce bulked, (also known as false-twist) 
synthetic yarns and as a result these reached 22% of output at the firm’s factory. At the same 
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time, faster and faster machines, at rapidly increasing capital cost, became available 
throughout the industry. In 1959, pressure from competitors outside the Silk Throwsters 
Association had caused price agreements on bulked yarns to be abandoned. Supply exceeded 
demand and price-cutting began. 29 Changes in proportions of the yarns produced by the firm 
over the period are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Proportions of Various Types of Yarns Handled at A&R, 1958-1963 
Year Nylon Terylene Silk Bulk 
Yarns 
Commission 
Processing 
Wire 
Covering 
Sundries Total 
1957/58 27.5 34.5 3.0 29.0 0 3.5 2.5 100 
1958/59 14.0 59.0 4.0 17.0 0 2.0 4.0 100 
1959-60 7.5 67.0 5.5 15.0 0 2.5 2.5 100 
1960/61 7.5 61.5 5.0 21.5 0 2.0 2.5 100 
1961/62 5.0 54.0 4.5 14.5 20.5 1.5 0.5 100 
July 1962-
Mar 1963 
9.5 37.0 8.5 16.5 25.0 3.0 0.5 100 
(Source: UGD 029/8) 
 
Between 1956 and 1962, the price A&R received for false-twist yarns fell from 12/- per 
pound to 3/- per pound, with prices received for Normal Twisted Nylon and Terylene yarns, 
for curtain nets, falling from 4/10d per pound to 3/11d per pound at the same time. Even the 
firm’s lowest volume product, silk insulating yarn for wires, almost halved in price from 
55/3d to 28/4d over this period. Although average monthly sales, in pounds of yarn, rose 
from 29,070 to 45,600 between 1957 and 1963, prices had never been worse. Furthermore, 
between 1960 and 1963, ‘Terylene’ processing fell from 67% of output to some 37% as 
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customers increasingly took this material up, untwisted, from other suppliers. The surplus 
capacity created as a result led to A&R twisting yarn for other firms on a commission basis, 
ie receiving the material from these firms free of charge and only being paid for the 
processing, which was less profitable. The firm was unprofitable every year from 1961. 30 
A&R noted that, from this year onwards, Kirklees Ltd., James Nelson & Sons Ltd., Lister & 
Co. Ltd., Park View Crepes Ltd. and S. Bourne & Co. Ltd., all large English companies, had 
given up yarn processing.  
 
Subsequent developments and options 
The firm noted that, as at March, 1963, a number of factors in the industry needed to be taken 
into account in any appraisal of future possibilities. Artificial fibres could now be made by 
primary producers on machines known as ‘spinnerettes’, which forced synthetic materials in 
liquid form through tiny holes in thimble-like metal dies, after which they dried out in usable 
filaments, such that the yarn twisting process was no longer required. It was anticipated that 
Nylon and Terylene yarns would be used in greater quantities, without twist, particularly in 
the production of warp threads for knitting. Since twistless yarns were cheaper, they would 
command a wider market. It was anticipated that ICI and British Nylon Spinners (BNS), the 
latter the firm which had been set up by ICI and Courtaulds to manufacture nylon in the late-
1930’s, would encourage textile manufacturers to change to twistless yarns and that they 
would command most of the market. It was also anticipated that there would be an increase in 
the level of technical support required of throwsters to knitters and weavers of fabric, 
including the production of woven fabric samples in new materials, for their appraisal. 
Further, some producers of new yarns were providing assistance with advertising and sales 
promotion, which was increasingly expected. 31  
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The prospects for silk were next assessed. Although it only at the time represented around 
eight per cent, by weight, of A&R’s output, its pricing had not been affected nearly as badly 
as the synthetic yarns the firm processed. While most of the firm’s silk in its earlier years had 
come from China, some 95% was now imported from Japan. A new trade agreement with 
Japan had just been signed which would allow the import into the UK of pure Japanese 
thrown silk at very challenging, competitive prices. It was felt that the new agreement was 
also likely to lead to the Japanese manipulating (increasing) the prices of raw yarn exported 
to the UK in order to make their thrown silk yarn imports even more competitive. A Chinese 
delegation was at that time visiting the Board of Trade, raising the prospects of competition 
for the Japanese in the form of Chinese silk imports, but the outcome was not known. The 
volumes of silk sold were not in any event large enough to be able to make a big difference to 
the firm’s future. 32  
 
This gloomy appraisal next switched to overheads. Industrial derating, the exemption or 
partial exemption of manufacturing firms from factory rates, which had been introduced in 
the 1920’s, was in 1963 being abolished in England and Wales and was under threat in 
Scotland. This measure had helped to protect British manufacturers from overseas imports. 
Wages at A&R had increased by 30% in the last five years, in the face of reducing revenues. 
One outcome of newer processing machinery operating ‘faster and faster’ was that the firm 
could produce more yarn in less space, causing space to become less profitable and 
increasingly redundant. It was also noted that subsidies to continental competitors were 
increasing, leading to ‘formidable’ competition. A&R received subsidies in some cases on 
nylon sourced from BNS, but this only amounted to about £500 per year. 33  
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In the light of these immediate and encroaching threats, the firm had approached five major 
firms within the industry about the possibility of a tie-up with A&R. The first of these, 
English Sewing Cotton Ltd., replied in October 1962, enclosing comments from Sir Cyril 
Harrison, Chairman, who was also President of the Federation of British Industries. He ‘was 
not at all happy about the prospects for the throwing capacity even within his own 
organisation and would, therefore, not consider a link under the present conditions’. ICI had 
also been approached in December 1962, and DN Marvin, a director of its Fibres Division, 
responded that ‘the life of a company in the Throwing Industry is very limited and that ‘such 
middlemen’ will gradually disappear. 34  
 
When approaches were made to Mr Asquith, Managing Director of Lister and Co. Ltd., the 
large English manufacturers of velvet fabrics which had already withdrawn from the 
throwing of yarns, A&R was informed on 21 February, 1963, that they intended pulling out, 
as quickly as possible, from the ‘synthetic field... which they consider is risky and shows a 
poor return’. It had also come to the attention of A&R that the Board of GH Heath & Co Ltd, 
a Manchester textiles manufacturer, had recorded in their Chairman’s report to the AGM of 4 
April, 1963, that they considered the throwing trade very difficult and that they had decided 
not to expand their throwing capacity and to deploy their resources in other directions. They 
had already closed two of their five mills. A&R had also interviewed the Managing Director 
of Wm. Tatton & Co Ltd on 19 February, 1963, who believed that the industry was 
contracting, but he felt that, with their trade connections and modern equipment, Tatton 
would be able to stay in throwing. They had already closed down one of their three mills. 35  
 
A&R associated these trends and developments with practical problems which would need to 
be addressed in order to maintain profitability in the face of falling prices, rising costs and a 
18 
 
pattern of demand towards less profitable lines. Of immediate relevance was the fact that the 
lace net firms of Darvel, Ayrshire, which had formerly been such  good customers to A&R, 
accounting in 1963 for some thirty per cent of turnover, looked likely to be withdrawing their 
business ‘within about a year’ as they moved over to twistless yarn. It would be 'financially 
impossible’ to fill their factory with new equipment, nor did they have the resources to 
provide the levels of technical service increasingly required in the trade. 36  
 
The firm’s premises next came in for appraisal. These consisted of the undernoted: 
 
Table 3: A&R’s Motherwell Factories - Key Data 
Old Mill and New Mill 
Date Built State of Repair Ground Floor Area Basement Area 
1883 Good  20,000 square feet 10,000 square feet 
1933-1950 Good  45,000 square feet 20,000 square feet 
 
Given these facts and facilities, what were the possible courses of action? A&R identified 
seven: 37  
 
1. Expand in the present premises, replacing all slow-producing and uneconomic plant 
with the latest false-twist machines. This would cost up to £300,000, resources which 
the company did not possess and could not acquire. 
2. Consolidate present facilities and activities into the smallest space, letting or selling 
the rest. This would be very difficult and the overheads saved would only range from 
£3,000 to £6,000 annually. 
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3. Move to a smaller mill and sell the whole of the Motherwell factory. This would be 
disruptive and expensive, and could only be justified if the industry was expanding. 
4. Merge with a larger firm with the capital to develop A&R. As noted above, the 
various attempts thus far to find partners had been unsuccessful, and in view of the 
state of the industry, were not likely to be successful in the future. 
5. Diversify gradually within the Motherwell plant, replacing existing business product 
by product. 
6. Diversify totally by closing down and restarting a completely new and different 
business. 
7. Close down completely. If possible this should be avoided, for the sake of staff and in 
view of existing customer goodwill. A quick close down would mean that poor prices 
would be obtained for the firm’s plant and buildings. A more gradual close down 
would realise better prices, but this would involve paying some overhead expenses 
until the closure was complete. 
 
Any course of action chosen would require careful planning at the beginning before any time 
or effort could be spent on it. Any plan which resulted in the large loss of female jobs could 
result in a compulsory purchase order by the Burgh of Motherwell, which at the time was 
involved in major plans to completely redevelop the town centre. All possible consideration 
should be given to employees with long service, whom the company had spent much money 
in training. 38  
 
The firm’s appraisal of the ongoing decline of the throwing industry led it to the conclusion 
that it should not depend completely upon it. In spite of increasing throughput and reducing 
costs, profit had still declined. Any plan to improve efficiency was likely to be no more than 
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a ‘palliative’. It was decided therefore that A&R should explore what possibilities there were 
for alternative products, choosing the most suitable of these in relation to the skills, 
knowledge and experience of staff and also the firm’s present manufacturing facilities, going 
on to examine the potential market for these products, then to prepare detailed production and 
marketing plans. It would be necessary to effect a smooth substitution of existing production 
with new production, ensuring in advance that the volumes of new product were sufficient to 
bring in the yarn throwing turnover displaced. In case none of this proved possible, A&R 
determined to investigate more fully the disposal of the premises or their acquisition by the 
Burgh of Motherwell. Should either of these two alternatives become likely, plans to 
revitalise the business would need reconsideration. 39  
 
It was felt that the company, although making losses at that juncture, was in a ‘viable’ 
condition and that it had the resources to develop new lines of work which could ensure a 
profitable and expanding future if bold action was taken immediately. However, it was 
recognised that this situation might not continue for long and that the Company’s problems 
could become ‘insoluble’. 
 
Subsequent Developments 
These thoughts were put to the rest of the Board and their permission was sought to engage 
Associated Industrial Consultants (AIC) to undertake a survey report, outlining how they 
would assist in implementing A&R’s plans. A&R had also engaged the consultants, Robson 
and Morrow, in the autumn of 1962. They had been asked by the firm to assess the situation it 
was in, replying in a note dated December 1962 that ‘the main cause of the current low level 
of profit is the acute competition in the trade’. These consultants had pointed out that if A&R 
chose to close the business down, it would give the shareholders ‘freedom to reinvest their 
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capital according to their own choice and presumably more profitability’. 40 Robson and 
Morrow had also recommended that A&R should engage AIC, which had a Market Research 
Division, for their advice. A&R decided, at a board meeting in the spring of 1963, that AIC 
should produce a survey of ‘diversification prospects’, which would take about three months, 
and the firm’s surveyors were asked to explore the possibility of a development company 
acquiring their factory as part of the proposed development plans in Motherwell. Somewhat 
paradoxically, the same board meeting reported that the firm had just installed three-ring 
spinners which it had purchased from Lister of Bradford, the world’s largest silk producers, 
and that a crimping machine for fibres would be ready shortly, with Lister promising to take 
the output. Stocks of finished thread had been building up. 41  
 
A board meeting held in the early summer of 1963 learned from the firm’s surveyors that the 
Motherwell development plans would probably not include the area in which the factory 
stood. It was decided that Robson and Morrow should conduct a costing study of the 
company’s products so that decisions could be made about which ones should be cut back. 
The company did not undertake product costing. Meantime, losses continued to be made. At 
a board meeting of 27 August, it was reported that the Depute Town Clerk of Motherwell had 
advised that the Burgh was re-planning the area around the factory and had asked whether the 
firm would consider moving from its present premises. JC Scott was authorised to advise the 
Burgh that A&R were prepared to enter into negotiations for the factory premises. The firm at 
this stage were considering approaching the Calico Printers Association about taking over the 
company, but decided to hold back in the meantime. AIC reported that A&R could examine 
the possibility of entering into contract assembly, contract packaging or mail order, and were 
going further into the first two. 42  
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Matters had not moved on much by the board meeting of 24 September. It was noted there, 
no doubt with some frustration, that the Burgh seemed to be doing nothing and should be 
pressed. Robson and Morrow had reported on product costs, but some errors required them to 
rectify the figures, after which they were to be asked if it would be advisable to discontinue 
certain lines. AIC were still investigating the prospects for contract packaging. It was decided 
to approach the Calico Printers Association about the prospects of a takeover. Meantime, the 
overdraft had risen to £76,000. 43  
 
By 5 November, it was reported that the sale of the factory to the Burgh would take some 
time, but A&R’s surveyors had advised that this would still result in the firm receiving a fair 
price. The Secretary advised the board that the Calico Printers Association were not 
interested in taking the firm over, but had recommended that they approach the Lancashire 
Cotton Corporation Ltd and also Lindustries Ltd., but nothing had yet been heard. In the 
meantime, JC Scott had approached Messrs Frost, but had been advised it was unlikely they 
would be interested. Robson Morrow’s amended product costs were tabled, and AIC had 
advised informally that the prospects for contract packaging were not good. ICI had agreed to 
pay the A &R £5,000 for the return of its Crimplene licence. A further board meeting of 21 
November recorded that Lancashire Cotton Industries were not interested in a takeover, while 
Frost were still considering the matter. The meeting therefore agreed ‘tentative plans’ to call 
an Extraordinary General Meeting for 10 January 1964 in order to pass a Special Resolution 
to voluntarily wind up the company. This was followed by the discussion of the plan of two 
directors, Scott and Ford, to purchase items of plant should the company cease to trade, 
subject to independent machinery valuations, in order to continue part of the firm’s existing 
business, the silk throwing side, if all else failed. Scott and Ford would be given until 15 
February, 1964, to take this offer up, or it would lapse.44  
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In Monday 16 December, a board meeting recorded new developments: Listers had enquired 
if the firm would be interested in a takeover, which Scott had agreed to discuss with them 
shortly, on a visit to their factory. The Group Economist from Viyella was visiting 
Motherwell on 17 December to look at a takeover. Messrs Scott and Ford made it clear that if 
either of the two parties currently interested in a takeover should go ahead but not be 
interested in the silk plant, their offer to acquire it would still stand and their project would 
continue. There was to be no last minute rescue from Viyella. It was reported at a board 
meeting of 27 January that the firm had written after their December visit that they were not 
interested in expanding the  type of capacity A&R had to offer, but Scott was able to report 
that Listers were definitely interested, and he had quoted them a share price of £27-10/-. The 
board minutes of 16 March record that Listers had visited the plant a few days earlier, but 
indicated that the share price requested was too high, so A&R agreed that the minimum price 
they would accept would be £20 per share. The next board meeting of 9 April was given the 
news by Mr Anderson and Mr Scott, who had just visited Listers, that this firm was no longer 
interested. The company then arranged an Extraordinary Meeting of Members for 27 May, to 
pass a resolution to wind the company up on the last day of July, 1964. This was reported to 
the Town Clerk, who had advised that the Burgh would be purchasing the factory. Scott and 
Ford confirmed they would be buying some of the assets for their silk venture, which they 
hoped would save the jobs of up to 60 of the work force. The company shut its doors on 31 
July 1964. Annualised sales for its last year of trading were £533,158, but these were made at 
a loss, the situation since 1961. 45  
 
By the time the liquidator had completed the dissolution of the company in 1967, the holders 
of the company’s 8,000 £10 ordinary shares had been paid four distributions amounting to 
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£25/14/- per share. In spite of four years of losses since 1960, the good values achieved for 
assets resulted in them receiving a payment for their shares almost the same as the 1960 
financial year-end book valuation of shareholders’ capital and reserves, that is, before the 
losses of 1961-64. 46  
 
Path dependence and A&R 
Was the firm path dependent? Was it indeed ‘ruled by one or more self-reinforcing 
mechanisms which lead to a narrowing of the variation and range of (managerial) discretion’, 
as Koch has put it? 47 This raises, first, the important question of what is meant by a ‘firm’ in 
relation to the business operated by A&R. It started up as a partnership in 1877 and became a 
limited company in 1895, which it remained until its closure in 1964. Its Articles of 
Association of 1895 make it clear that the limited company was a continuation of the 
business formerly run as a partnership by A&R from 1877, and it is thus treated here as a 
single firm, 48 which, we will argue, became path dependent. 
 
Its chosen strategy centred, from 1877 to the early 1900s, on the production of silk yarn, as a 
‘producer’ firm which served silk fabric manufacturers. In addition to this, however, at this 
time it also made tailor’s trimmings in Glasgow, in the 1880s, 49 and from the 1890s until 
about the turn of the century, it produced silk shawls, scarves and handkerchiefs in 
Motherwell, using 70 workers. 50 Information is limited, but the poor state of the world silk 
trade in the decades surrounding the beginning of the twentieth century meant that the firm 
continued to produce silk fabrics and related products in addition to yarn across its plants to 
take up production capacity, although the quantities are not known.  
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Prospects looked up in 1911, when the production of silk yarn windings for the emergent 
electricity industry, to insulate electrical wires, came into the firm, and likewise, in 1924, the 
production of unboiled nylon yarn for making silk stockings improved capacity utilisation 
and profitability, lifting profits in these depression years. By this period, the firm only 
manufactured silk yarn. From 1951, it made various changeovers to synthetic fibres, 
beginning with nylon in 1951, at which time the silk business had reduced to a marginal 
volume within A&R and made redundant much of the firm’s silk production machinery, 
which on the whole was old. Over the 1950’s A&R then experienced reduced demand for its 
products and competition within the industry, which intensified in the 1950s, leading to 
falling prices. These made the firm unprofitable, unable to diversify and thus unable to 
continue. We argue that path dependence developed, as follows, using the three stages 
posited by Sydow, Schreyogg and Koch (2009): 
 
Phase one: open situation 
At its commencement in 1877, as noted earlier, A&R committed itself to avoiding the trap 
into which the predecessor Morris Pollok silk business had fallen, of attempting to sell silk 
yarn to competitors while also making silk cloth and thus competing with its own yarn 
customers, who departed to other suppliers. Before this date, George Robertson, the founding 
partner, had been the cashier at Morris Pollok and thus in the perfect position to see what had 
gone wrong there. As John M Scott, one of A&R's first directors put it, ‘by engaging in the 
manufacturing trade he [Pollok] lost his customers for silk yarn, as he was now competing 
with them’. 51 In practice, the new A&R firm had its production facilities at Govan (from 
1877), Motherwell (from 1890), and Glemsford, in Surrey, slightly later, to keep occupied, 
and, although information is scant, as noted above, it put some fabric production into its 
shops from time to time and was not in practice narrowly committed to yarn production. This 
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corresponds with the ‘open situation’ of wide choice which Sydow, Schreyogg and Koch 
posit in their paper of 2009 as ‘Phase One’ on the road to path dependence.  
 
Phase two: formation 
In terms of ‘Phase Two’, ‘the gradual emergence of an organisational path’, this may be seen 
in A&R’s response to the growing electrical industry, where it found business as producers of 
silk yarn for electrical wire winding, from 1912, a business in which it succeeded, which 
significantly increased profits and in which it remained for the rest of its life. From that year 
until the depressed early-1920s, the firm’s returns on capital employed moved to double 
digits, levels of profit not achieved since 1896. Matters had been helped by the demand for 
wire windings during World War 1. The onset of the mass-produced silk stocking, based on 
unboiled silk yarn, which the firm began to supply in 1924, kept profits at a handsome level, 
rising to unprecedented heights in the 1930’s, as Table 1 shows. It is clear that the 
achievement of steady, and indeed rising, profits, associated with apparently ineluctable 
market place trends in technology and fashion, both increased confidence in the future of silk 
yarn. The organisational path was firming up. 
 
Phase three: lock-in 
By 1935, the returns on capital employed were at their highest since the firm’s 
commencement, exceeding 25% for the first time that year. The progressive investment over 
the years in faster and better silk yarn-winding machinery meant that productivity had never 
been higher, such that the workforce had dropped to around 300 staff. It was decided to 
consolidate the firm’s operations in its Motherwell factory and the Glemsford and Govan 
plants were closed at around the same time. A large factory extension was built at Motherwell 
in 1934. The firm was now very deeply and narrowly committed to silk, to silk yarn only, as 
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a middleman operation, with all its technological resources and people skills ‘in one basket’, 
in one single location. From this point onwards A&R could hardly have been any more 
circumscribed in its strategy, indeed, it was locked into it. As Schreyogg et al put it, the lock-
in phase is characterised by ‘further constriction...[whereby]... the dominant pattern gets fixed 
and even gains a quasi-deterministic character’. 52  
 
We therefore confirm that the journey to path dependence engaged on by A&R corresponds 
with the three phase route identified by Sydow et al 53 and developed by Schreyogg et al. 54  
 
Attempted breakout 
World War 2 affected business, with lesser profits from the manufacture of parachute silk 
yarn and silk yarn for wire winding, followed by the austerity years up to 1954, when 
rationing was finally lifted. The company had been well aware of rival products in other man-
made materials increasingly appearing on the horizon throughout the 1920’s and 30’s, such as 
rayon, or nylon for stockings, but stayed away from them, apart from the experimental 
winding of rayon, called ‘artificial silk’, for wartime purposes, of which it had gained some 
experience. Finally responding to these trends at the turn of the 1950s, the firm made large 
investments in the necessary air conditioning and filtering plant, as well as continuously 
updating its throwing machinery to faster versions suited to man-made fibres. As a result of 
the firm’s skill base being focussed on silk production up to this point, it had to engage in 
extensive training programmes to acclimatise staff to the production of artificial yarns. It thus 
switched its focus to the demand for twisted synthetic yarn. There were rejections of 
unsatisfactory product by A&R’s customers as the new yarns came to be produced. The 
results were as shown at Table 2 above, mediocre, reducing, profits, while customers 
gradually turned away from twisted yarn, as throwster after throwster went out of business in 
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the face of increasing concentration in the trade and rapidly changing, more expensive 
technology. There was nowhere to turn and liquidation followed. These developments, as was 
seen above, were a frenetic attempt, too little, too late, to reverse the firm’s path dependence 
on silk. 
 
Reinforcement and feedback 
We now turn our attention to the reinforcing ‘feedback’ factors identified by Sydow, 
Schreyogg and Koch 55 we referred to earlier, which cause firms to remain path dependent, to 
see how these operated at A&R.  
 
1) Coordination effects 
The positive attributes of the firm’s specialisation in the spinning of silk into yarn in its 
buildup to path dependence can be identified from old photographs of the shop floor in its 
Motherwell and Govan factories. 56 Clear and rational production layouts of spinning 
machinery minimised the wastage of time and thus reduced coordination and handling costs 
of raw materials and finished goods, which were thus able to be efficiently controlled on the 
shop floor by female supervisors (‘denters’).  
 
2) Complementary effects 
The ‘complementary effects’ of producing a limited range of yarns, in the form of reduced 
selling costs, were realised, as the narrow range of products meant that a small number of 
selling agents could handle all the company’s output. Latterly, one sales agent sold A&Rs 
product for the whole of England. 57  
 
3) Learning effects 
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There were learning effects and related cost savings as the workforce and the management 
operated more efficiently as their experience grew. These are difficult to verify directly, as 
they were not measured, but it can reasonably be assumed these gains were made in a cost-
conscious firm such as A&R was and were retained in the firm, as it enjoyed low staff 
turnover over most of its life. These advantages were nullified as it changed over to synthetic 
fibre production in the 1950s.  
 
4) Adaptive expectation effects 
On the other hand, no evidence of ‘adaptive expectation’ effects, the reluctance to speak out 
critically among management for fear of adverse career outcomes, can be found.  
 
The above reinforcements provided reassurance that the selected path was a wise choice, 
revealing the opposite during the 1950s. 
 
The gains outlined above enhanced the positive feedback generated by the good profits to 
which they contributed, climaxing at 28.2% RCE in 1937, around the point where we judge 
the firm became ‘locked-in’ and confirmed its decision to focus on the narrow path chosen. 
The profits only began to slide consistently in the 1950’s, disappearing at the start of the 
1960’s, as Table 1 and associated commentary above shows. The negative feedback effects 
of the reducing profits were offset by other financial factors. The vast majority of the shares 
were owned by members of the Anderson and Robertson families. Although the Robertsons 
had not continued in the business after the death of George Robertson in the 1920’s, various 
members of the family still held 25 per cent of the ordinary shares in the 1960’s. The 
Anderson family, represented on the board by WFT Anderson, chairman, who succeeded his 
father, WK Anderson, as chairman on his death in 1957, also held between them 64 percent 
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of the shares. James Charles Scott, the Managing Director, together with other members of 
the Scott family, held eleven per cent of the shares. The shares they owned in the firm were 
thus inherited wealth, not directly contributed by themselves and not easily marketable as 
they were shares in a private limited company, so falling returns on capital employed and 
reducing dividends, the latter caused by the growing need to reinvest profits in machinery, 
were less noticeable than they would have been if their own cash had been involved. Also 
significant was the fact that the directors could rely on the good salaries they took, which 
included commissions on profits and occasionally bonuses. 58  
 
Reinforcement - contextual conditions/culture 
Aside from the above more obvious and tangible forms of reinforcement of a strategic path, 
there are the softer, more elusive reinforcing factors which are located within an 
organization’s culture, as pointed out by David, and to which we have referred, above. These 
include the ‘enduring constraints’ of the existing ways of doing things and the notions of 
what courses of action are mutually acceptable among senior management. These factors can 
give rise to ‘stasis’ within a firm, through its strategies. The authors of the present paper 
wished to establish what contextual constraints might have applied at A&R in the emergence 
of path dependence and lock-in. This posed a difficult problem for the authors, since the firm 
disappeared some 50 years ago, and no survivors of its management were known to exist. It 
was not therefore possible to ask those who had been directly involved questions about the 
firm’s culture and related constraints.  
 
This pushed us in the direction of the archival sources. While these are generally full and 
comprehensive, the firm’s board minutes do not contain any direct or detailed discussions of 
strategy, which only appear in reports from the crisis years of the early 1960s. The 
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information that was relevant was largely found in the firm’s less formal sources, particularly 
the short company history written in 1957 and the manuscript notes which were made in 
order to prepare it. There, evidence of the firm’s symbols, heroes, rituals and myths was 
discovered, which suggested, in accordance with Hofstede’s ‘onion’ model, that these three 
signifiers, or layers, of the organisation’s culture could be used to reconstruct it, and its 
relations with strategy, albeit partially 59. These ‘layers’ are discussed in turn:  
 
Heroes 
In terms of the firm’s heroes, the first of these were clearly its founders, Anderson and 
Robertson, who, according to WT Anderson, chairman from 1957, had ‘built up a very 
successful silk throwing business’, seeing, in 1877, the ‘opportunity’ afforded by the failure 
of the Morris Pollok business under Pollok’s son. JM Scott had joined them in 1883, coming 
himself to share the glory afforded to the founder-directors. 60 On Scott's death in 1960 he 
was given the bulk of the credit by the board for building the business up across the twentieth 
century, being ‘greatly missed in the company and by the Silk Trade generally’. 61 Anderson 
had, in the 1890’s, at ‘great personal sacrifice’, rescued the firm from severe financial distress 
caused by the failure of a major debtor, drawing also on his friendship with a silk broker, 
Durant, to ease the situation. 62 Together, the three directors had overcome trade fluctuations 
and financial pressures, associated, significantly, with the silk trade, taking forward and 
strengthening the business through thick and thin, finally consolidating it in Motherwell.  
 
Veneration of the firm’s ‘heroes’ was perpetuated by the fact that the second generation 
directors were still board members until the early 1950s, as very old men, sometimes handing 
over to sons, sometimes sitting on the board together with their sons, the third generation of 
directors. On the death of WK Anderson in 1957, ‘the great services he has rendered to the 
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company and the high regard...the board had for his business acumen and general character’ 
were eulogised in the minutes by his son and his fellow directors. 63 . Moreover, it should be 
noted that the firm remained ‘silk-minded’ until the end. The same John M Scott who had 
joined the firm in 1883 had, as late as 1953, stated with a mixture of regret and hope that the 
‘The craze for nylon yarn has meantime reduced the demand for pure silk to almost nil’. 64 
He clearly hoped that silk would one day prevail again, at a time when nylon and other new 
materials were forging ahead across the textile industry. It is clear that the firm had been 
attempting to avoid the production of artificial yarns as long as it could. It was certainly well 
aware of their rapid uptake across the industry from the late 1920s onwards, 65 but by the 
1950s, it could no longer resist.  
 
The second generation successors also received joint approbation from the third generation, 
WFT Anderson and JC Scott, for negotiating ‘the very difficult transition from large scale 
silk throwing to large scale throwing of man-made fibres’. 66 The veneration of predecessors 
was of course inextricably bound up with the, clearly good, filial relationships between the 
various generations and the financial provision each generation had made for the succeeding 
one through the business. The lock-in of the mid-thirties was indeed culturally-related, bound 
up with the veneration by the firm’s leaders, of silk, a material which, over the years, was 
subject to wide fluctuations of supply, especially during and after World War 2, and also to 
the whims of fashion, which the directors knew too well but continued to downplay well into 
the 1950s. 
 
Rituals 
There were two activities within the firm which were not strictly necessary in business terms, 
although they had some usefulness, which may be seen as organisational rituals. The first of 
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these was the firm’s membership of the British Silk Throwsters Association, of which it was 
a founder member from 1933. Its relationships with the Association, as well as keeping it 
abreast of trade prices, price agreements and other developments, acted as a reinforcement of 
the firm’s sense of longevity in a trade which provided up-market goods, a further source of 
pride. A second ritual was the firm’s use of, and respect for, Scottish chartered accountants 
(CAs), the most prestigious Scottish body of professional accountants. A&R’s auditors from 
1895 were CAs, Thomson, Jackson, Gourlay and Taylor. Its company secretary, JC Gemmill, 
had been a CA from the auditors’ practice for many years. A non-executive member of the 
board, JM Carswell CA, was also from the firm’s auditors. JC Scott, the last managing 
director, was himself a CA. In due course, when the firm was liquidated, the liquidators were 
members of the auditors’ CA practice. Clearly the firm valued financial strength and the 
sense of respectability and reassurance afforded by these links, given through the annual 
‘rituals of verification’ 67 and the frequent holding of board meetings in the auditors’ offices 
in Glasgow. At the AGM in 1958, it was noted that 'the company is in a strong position 
financially, thanks to the wise policy pursued by our predecessors over many years’, which 
they intended to continue. At the 1963 AGM, it was recorded that the firm had ‘again had 
able and invaluable help from Mr Carswell and Mr Gemmill’. 68  
 
The firm’s prominence in the Silk Throwsters’ Association from 1933 is likely to have played 
its part in 1935, when it locked-in its strategic path around silk yarn manufacture, with large 
investments, relocation to, and concentration in, Motherwell. Its other ‘ritualistic’ activity of 
immersing itself in chartered accountants, which served it increasingly from its incorporation 
1895 until the end, appears to have given it a sense of financial invulnerability which both 
eased its lock-in, in 1935, and inured it to the truth about its imminent demise until the early 
1960s. 
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Symbols 
Another component of the organisation's culture was the symbolism deployed within the 
firm. This was largely confined to the long-standing use of the Scottish bluebell trade mark 
on its stationery. This signified the national origin of its goods (the bluebell flower is 
regarded as a symbol of Scotland) and also served to remind those who were aware of it that 
the firm was descended from Scotland's first silk throwsters and, from the beginning of the 
twentieth century, was the last of the Scottish silk throwsters. There was also the firm’s 
telegraphic address, ‘Cocoon, Motherwell’, helping to keep its silk heritage in the public eye 
as well as in the eyes of staff. Having been adopted as a trade mark in 1912 as A&R took up 
silk wire-winding yarn, the humble bluebell remained an inspiration and a reminder of the 
firm's successful lines of silk business at the time of lock-in, as did the ‘Cocoon’ address, 
adopted from 1935.  
 
Myths 
There were also organisational ‘myths’ which contributed to the strong sense of culture 
within the business, related to past events in its history. Although not cited as a layer of the 
cultural ‘onion’ devised by Hofstede, Gabriel 69 has observed that organisational stories and 
myths ‘are essentially fulfilments of unconscious wishes’ and as such, form part of 
organizational culture and are thus pertinent to the present case. The firm continued to be 
very proud of the fact that its factory girls (at the time still working for Morris Pollok), had 
waved to Queen Victoria and Prince Albert as they sailed up the Clyde in 1849, welcoming 
the Queen ashore by singing the National Anthem. As the royal yacht, the Victoria and 
Albert, passed the Govan factory, ‘Her Majesty graciously bowed her acknowledgement to 
the singers, who replied by cheering and waving silk handkerchiefs’ which had been specially 
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woven for this purpose. A&R had an etching of the scene made up as a letterhead they were 
using for communications with employees 50 years later and still referring to the event in a 
short company history published by a trade journal as late as 1958. 70 While the firm wished 
to read this event as validation of its worth and its products from the Queen herself, there is 
of course no proof that Victoria had taken special notice of A&R, its workforce or its 
products at all.  
 
Nevertheless, a print of the scene remained in the managing director’s office until the end. 
Similarly, in 1886, at the Edinburgh International Exhibition, Mr Anderson had presented 
Queen Victoria with a dozen silk handkerchiefs, specially woven out of A&R silk yarn at 
their stand, of which the firm made much across the generations. Another way in which the 
firm constructed a meaningful past for itself related to its service to the country during World 
War Two. It believed that ‘at least two-thirds of all British aeroplanes that flew during the 
war carried in their electrical instruments Motherwell processed silk or rayon’, but this was 
probably an optimistic guess. 71 Again, these imaginings by the firm of its importance in the 
world of silk and to the nation that must have contributed to the lock-in of the mid-1930s and 
during the years immediately following. 
 
In short, A&R was a very proud firm with a long and successful history, one that the shop 
floor employees, as well as the directors, are likely to have absorbed as a result of the close, 
‘hands on’ involvement of the directors in the firm’s Motherwell factory. The brief history of 
1958, referred to above, concluded with the following statement, which clearly emanated 
from A&R: 
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‘In future, the Company will serve the textile industry at home and abroad with all the skill 
acquired in the manipulation of yarns over the last 82 years, and with the technical and 
scientific skills to be acquired over the next 82’.  
 
Clearly the firm's strong sense of pride made it difficult for it to believe that it could ever be 
forced out of the throwing industry. It was, in making the above statement, ignoring what was 
happening within it and all around it, which, while it may have been accepted intellectually 
by the directors, was never fully accepted in practice, and cash drained out of the firm 
between 1961 and 1964 as a result of its failed ‘breakout’ attempt. As the account given 
above reveals, in the spring of 1963, with the help of consultants, A&R had laid out and 
considered, with impeccable, detailed logic, the diversification options realistically open to 
the firm on the one hand, while on the other hand, the great irony was that the directors had 
just purchased ring spinners for the processing of bulk yarns, betraying their real desire to 
continue as throwsters. The dogged detail in which it examined the various strategic options 
it saw was perhaps an over-intellectualisation which helped the directors to defer the anxiety 
that the firm they loved so much might well be doomed. 72 Meantime, they continued to hold 
out hope of rescue by takeover, suffering losses in order to preserve the firm as a going 
concern, to attract a purchaser. This solution would have allowed the firm to continue as a 
subsidiary of a larger firm, perhaps still retaining its separate identity and with the same 
directors. 
 
Even after the door was shut, a new firm was formed in late 1964, Scott and Ford Ltd, 
opening premises at Java Street in a different part of Motherwell, employing some 60 people 
in silk yarn throwing for wire insulation and other purposes. The lingering appeal of silk yarn 
manufacture, although it had suffered greatly from the time of World War 2, could not be 
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resisted, even beyond A&R’s end. No records of the new firm are known to have survived, 
but its liquidation is recorded in the London Gazette of 1972. 73 Scott and Ford, in opening 
this plant, also ignored the principle that Scott himself had been involved in formulating at 
A&R in 1961, when one of the options considered was to: ‘Move to a smaller mill and sell 
the whole of the Motherwell factory’. It had been noted at the time, as was discussed earlier, 
that ‘This would be disruptive and expensive, and could only be justified if the industry was 
expanding’. 74 It was not. Today, with the exception of one Italian factory, all silk yarn is 
produced outside Europe, coming mostly from China and Japan, a development that was 
looking likely in the early 1960s and well known to A&R, 75 if never fully accepted. 
Furthermore, from the 1950’s onwards, greater and greater amounts of electrical cable across 
the world were being insulated with PVC and related plastics, 76 also a well known fact at the 
time which the working directors either chose to disregard or failed to discover.  
 
Closing remarks -breaking paths 
Sydow, Schreyogg and Koch 77 consider a variety of approaches to breaking organisational 
paths, centred on ‘addressing the emotional side of inertial organisational patterns’, which are 
driven by ‘self-reinforcing dynamics’, 78 an assertion the present case study has borne out. 
Unfortunately, recommendations by the above authors to utilise techniques such as 
‘Assumption Surfacing’, designed to isolate and then question the underlying logic behind 
strategy, are only suited to management groups in larger organisations and beyond the reach 
of firms of the scale of A&R. There were only three active directors in the firm, who worked 
‘hands on’ in their business on a day-to-day basis, themselves with three or four others 
constituting the senior site management and unlikely to be available for rarefied discussions, 
even if these techniques had been available to a firm which ceased to exist in 1964.  
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Not available to the firm, either, were any of the mental supports of modern strategic 
management theory, even simple ones such as SWOT analysis, which would have required 
the firm to think seriously about threats and weaknesses. Thinkers on strategy such as Ansoff 
79 had yet to come into the public eye, with Porter 80 and Mintzberg 81 decades in the future. 
A&R relied on their consultants, who were only able to confirm their own analysis, also 
relying on their own knowledge of their business, but as has been shown, emotional and 
historical attachment distorted their reasoning. The directors did, however, to their credit, 
liquidate the business before its assets drained away, either by good luck, good judgement, or 
both, finally unlocking a satisfactory value from their shares which was greater than they 
would have been prepared to sell the company for. In that sense, they did not leave it too late, 
although it is likely that Scott and Ford Ltd squandered some of the capital recovered in a 
new business that appears to have been doomed from the start. In some respects, therefore, 
A&R enjoyed some post lock-in success, if not of a lasting kind: keeping the business alive 
throughout the 1950s and early 1960s; achieving good exit values for shareholders; sustaining 
a short-lived successor business. This achievement confirms the views of Scheyrogg, Sydow 
and Holtmann that lock-in should not be seen as a ‘situation of total rigidity that excludes any 
further choices...[and thus]...it cannot be equated with determinism’. 82  
 
Conclusion 
In summary, the above study has demonstrated in quite precise detail the decline of a path 
dependent firm, A&R, validating the broad three-phase analytical framework of Sydow, 
Schreyogg and Koch 83 as a tool suitable for the analysis of path dependence in smaller firms, 
subject to further investigation through more detailed empirical studies. 
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The present study has also analysed, in considerable detail, some of the less obvious and 
more elusive self-reinforcing mechanisms producing or maintaining path dependence, as 
called for by Sydow, Schreyogg and Koch. 84 These, as was shown, were powerful, deeply 
rooted in the firm’s culture, linked to and reinforced by the firm’s succession through three 
key families which shared ownership and direction of the firm across three generations. 
Whereas Schreyogg, Sydow, and Holtmann, in their study of Bertelsmann’s Book Club, refer 
broadly to the influence of the firm’s ‘glorious past’ on its path-dependent strategy, we have 
enhanced understanding of this aspect by managing to trace developments and biases at A&R 
which give valuable insights into how this firm perceived its own ‘glorious past’ and how this 
was transmuted into its present and future, a useful insight for students of management. 85  
 
The limitations of the above case study relate to the nature of academic discourse concerning 
path dependence, and to the constraints of historical research more generally. In progressing 
our study, we came across many of the ‘blurry and controversial constructs’ to which Vergne 
and Durand refer. 86 We pondered the practical meaning of unclear phrases such as 
‘contingent choice’ or ‘critical juncture’ in academic papers as we attempted to make sense of 
A&R’s experience, eventually understanding these as referring to the more significant 
changes, as we saw them, in the nature of their business. This brought us to the conclusion 
that our interpretation of the firm’s history was to some extent tentative, especially when the 
information surviving was patchy in a few places, causing us to wonder if more important 
facts which might have been hidden from us in the firm’s past would have significantly 
changed our interpretation. These problems are, however, part of the warp and woof of 
historical research, and, on balance, we feel that we are broadly right. We certainly disagree 
with Vergne and Durand when they state that the abandonment of the case study as a research 
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tool would lead to greater insights into path dependence, since other methods, too, have their 
drawbacks. 87  
 
To recapitulate, in this paper, we have gone behind technological and strategic aspects of path 
dependence to touch on its deep roots in an organisation’s psyche, exposing another vital link 
between culture and strategy in firms. As Sydow, Schreyogg and Koch observe, this is ‘an 
issue of high relevance in strategic management and organizational decision making’, 88 and 
as such, deserving of even more research. 
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